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Abstract 
This paper uses a bivariate probit model to analyze firms' decisions to impose regimes of exclusive dealing and/or 
exclusive territories with their distributors. We employ a panel data set of manufacturing firms (from 1990 to 2005) 
that contains information about such vertical restraints. Firms report whether they impose vertical restraints on their 
distributors (retailers or wholesalers) and the type: resale price maintenance, full line forcing, exclusive dealing, and/or 
exclusive territories. Our results show that the likelihood of imposing exclusive dealing and/or exclusive territories 
varies widely by industry and that small size greatly reduces the likelihood of imposing exclusive dealing (but not 
exclusive territories). The results also show the existence of complementarities between exclusive territories and 
exclusive dealing but not with other types of restraint.
Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education (ECO2008-05771) is gratefully acknowledged. Usual disclaimers apply. 
Citation: Xulia González and Daniel Miles, (2011) ''Estimating complementarity among vertical restraints: Evidence from manufacturing firms'', 
Economics Bulletin, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3331-3338. 
Contact: Xulia González - xgzlez@uvigo.es, Daniel Miles - dmiles@uvigo.es. 
Submitted: February 25, 2011.   Published: December 12, 2011. 
 
     Economics Bulletin, 2011, Vol. 31 No. 4 pp. 3331-3338
  
 
1.  Introduction 
 
 
Manufacturers rarely supply to final consumers; instead, most industries are vertically 
separated between upstream firms (e.g., the manufacturers) and downstream firms (the 
wholesales and retailers). In practice, vertical restraints most often arise when the upstream firm 
or manufacturer restricts its downstream distributor choices.
1 
 
Vertical restraints are grouped into price and non-price restraints. The former group consists 
of resale price maintenance, whereby a distributor commits to a retail price. This can take the 
form of a fixed price, a minimum or a maximum resale price, or even a recommended price. Non-
price restraints include exclusive territories, where a distributor is assigned a geographic territory 
by the manufacturer and given monopoly rights to sell in that area; exclusive dealing, whereby a 
distributor is not allowed to carry the brands of competing manufacturers; and full-line forcing, 




The motives for imposing vertical restraints are usually grouped into two categories: 
efficiency motives and anticompetitive motives.
3 Vertical restraints can be necessary in some 
cases for an efficient distribution, though they also raise concerns about enhancing market 
power.
4 Attitudes of the courts and competition authorities toward vertical restraints vary 
significantly from one country to another and from one period to another.
5 Nowadays the rule-of-
reason approach is generally applied in most regulations. This means that there is no a priori 




Although there is broad theoretical literature on the determinants and effects of vertical 
restraints and on exclusive dealing and exclusive territories in particular there has been little 
empirical evaluation of vertical restraints.
7 Most empirical contributions are focused on particular 
industries that are dominated by large firms (e.g., beer, movie distribution, gasoline, auto 
distribution). Even so, there is no systematic plant-level evidence on the scope of vertical 
restraints in manufacturing industries. 
 
Furthermore, most theoretical and empirical papers analyse the determinants or effects of 
vertical restraints in isolation. In practice, however, different vertical restraints might well appear 
in combination in the same contract. When multiple restraints are feasible, the results of a 
                                                 
1See article 2(1) of European Commision Regulation (EC) nº 2790|1999 of 22 December 1999. 
2 See Rey and Tirole (1986) and Rey and Vergé (2005) for a more exhaustive classification of vertical restraints. 
3 See Motta (2004, chap. 6) for a survey of the theoretical models on vertical restraints. 
4See Motta (2004), Cooper et al. (2005a, 2005b), Rey and Vergé (2005), Verouden (2007) and Lafontaine and Slade 
(2008), for surveys of the literature on the effects of vertical integration and vertical restrictions on inter- and 
intrabrand competition. 
5Comanor-Rey (1997) compare the evolution of the attitudes of the U.S. and E.U. competition authorities. 
6 This is the basis of the most recent European regulation on vertical restrictions published in the Guidelines on 
Vertical Restraints (2000). 
7 See Lafontaine and Slade (2008, 2010) for a survey of empirical papers. 
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theoretical model may not hold up. Different vertical restraints can often be used to achieve 
similar objectives, so a policy prohibiting a specific restraint might be ineffective. 
 
This paper contributes to filling the gap in empirical literature on exclusive agreements and 
examines whether and to what extent manufacturing firms impose exclusive agreements. The 
paper also analyses firm decisions to impose exclusive dealing and/or exclusive territories on 
their distributors. To asses the relationship between these two types of restraints, we estimate a 
bivariate probit model for a panel data of Spanish manufacturing firms from 1990 to 2005.  
 
Results show that the likelihood of exclusive dealing and/or exclusive territories varies 
widely by industry and that small size greatly reduces the likelihood of exclusive dealing but not 
of exclusive territories. Our results also demonstrate the existence of complementarities between 
exclusive territories and exclusive dealing but not with other vertical restraint types. 
 
Questions regarding the complementarities between different vertical restraints are especially 
relevant for antitrust authorities because joint exclusive agreements could exacerbate their own 
possible anticompetitive effects. Competition regulations on vertical agreements usually focus on 
the anticompetitive effects of particular restrictions. This paper emphasizes the importance of 
considering more than a single restriction in the analysis of vertical restraints. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and presents some 
empirical regularities on vertical restraints in manufacturing firms. Section 3 details the empirical 





The data set used in this paper is a firm-level survey representative of the Spanish 
manufacturing sector, sponsored by the Ministry of Industry, the Survey on Firm Strategies 
(Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales). The panel data extends from 1990 to 2006, 
although the variables related to vertical restraints are surveyed only every fourth year (1990, 
1994, 1998, 2002 and 2006). The survey also contains information on the distribution channels 
used by the firms. Firms report their percentage of sales via three main distribution channels: 
direct sale, own distribution network, and/or intermediaries. For firms that sell their products to 
intermediaries, the survey indicates whether the manufacturer imposes any type of vertical 
restraint on the distributors and, if so, includes information on which type.  
 
Table 1 reports the number of firms in the sample each period. The data base contains 
information on 5,786 observations of firms with 200 or fewer workers and 2,618 with more than 
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Table 1. Number of firms per year in the sample 
 




1990 1385  638 
1994 1148  535 
1998 1211  498 
2002 1143  512 
2006 899  435 
Total 5786  2618 
 
 
As mentioned previously, firms report the percentage of sales made through each distribution 
channel. In some cases, all their production is sold directly to final consumers (in the case of final 
goods) or to other firms (mainly in the case of intermediate goods) or via their own distribution 
channel. In other cases, firms sell (all or part of) their production via intermediaries (retailers or 
wholesalers). Note also that firms frequently use more than one channel to distribute their 
products. We consider the main distribution channel as the one providing the highest proportion 
of sales. 
 
Table 2. Firms‘ main distribution channel 
 
  200 or fewer 
workers    More than 200 
workers 
 Nº  %    Nº  % 
Retailer/ wholesalee  2245  28.8    1158  44.2 
Direct selling  3040  52.2    1186  45.3 
Own network  354  6.1    236  9.0 
Mixed 147  2.5    38  1.5 
Total 5786  100    2618  100 
 
 
Table 2 shows that almost half of the firms use direct selling as the main distribution system. 
These firms typically produce intermediate goods, and their clients are other firms. About 40% of 
firms sell most of their products to intermediaries. A very small percentage of firms use their own 
distribution network as the main channel of distribution. Table 3 indicates the number of firms 








Table 3. Firms with intermediaries and vertical restraints 
 




 Nº  %  Nº  % 
Without intermediaries  2376  41.1  882  33.7 
        
With intermediaries  3410  58.9  1736  66.3 
    With vertical restraints  970  28.5  836  48.2 
    Without vertical restraints  2440  71.5  900  51.8 
Total 5786    2618   
 
 
The tabulated data show that vertical restraints increase with size. Large firms impose vertical 
restraints more frequently on their intermediaries (wholesalers or retailers) than do small and 
medium ones: 48% for large firms and 28% for small and medium firms.  
 
 
Table 4. Summary of firms with exclusive agreements 
 
  200 or fewer 
workers 
More than 200 
workers 
 Nº  %  Nº  % 
Only exclusive dealing  102  10.5  102  12.2 
Only exclusive territories  297  30.6  230  27.5 
Both exclusive restraints  224  23.1  230  27.5 
Other types of vertical restraints  247  35.8  274  32.8 




Finally, Table 4 summarizes the number of manufacturing firms that sign exclusive 
agreements with their intermediaries, conditioning on firms that impose vertical restraints. 
Exclusive territories is the most frequent restriction used by Spanish manufacturing firms, but a 
significant number of them impose both types of exclusive agreements. One third of firms 








3. Empirical specification and results 
 
The decision to impose a vertical restraint is typically a discrete choice. A standard bivariate 
probit model is estimated where the imposition of exclusive dealing and exclusive territories are 
treated as two separate binary decisions. The equations can be written as follows: 
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Here  IEDit  and  IETit are indicator variables for firms that impose exclusive dealing 
agreements and exclusive territories, respectively. This specification does not include any source 
of intertemporal correlation; however, it does allow the contemporaneous correlation between the 
two choices, ) , ( if it t d Corr   , to be non zero. The explanatory variables are three lagged dummy 
variables  ) ( 1
k
it EA I  , where   3 , 2 , 1  k , that take the value 1 for firms that impose (respectively) 
exclusive dealing, exclusive territory or both restraints. A lagged dummy variable (v) takes the 
value 1 if firm i imposed another (non-exclusive) vertical restraint. This specification let us to 
explore the complementarities between them. Finally, the vector of control variables includes 6 
size dummies, year dummies and industry dummies and other firm characteristics whether the 
firm reports advertising and R&D expenditures and whether it is an exporter firm.  
 
Year dummies take into account temporal shocks that are common to all firms, especially the 
changes in vertical restraint regulations after 2000. The industry dummies (20 included) capture 
industry heterogeneity in the use of vertical agreements.
8  
 
The results of the bivariate specification are reported in Table 5. The first and second 
columns present the estimated coefficients (and robust standard errors in parentheses) for the 
decision to exclusive territories and exclusive dealing, respectively. Firms with territorial 
agreements in the previous period, either alone or in combination with exclusive dealing 
agreements, are more likely to impose territorial restraints in the current period. The impact of 
imposing exclusive dealing is also positive and significant, but the magnitude is lower.  In the 
case of exclusive dealing, the effect of both restraints is positive and significant, although the 
magnitude of the territorial restraint is lower.   
                                                 
8 The industries that impose both restraints more frequently are Beverage, Vehicles and accessories and Industrial 
and agricultural machinery. 
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Table 5: Results of estimating the bivariate probit model 
 
  Exclusive territories    Exclusive dealing 
 Coefficient  S.E.    Coefficient    S:E 
Intercept  -2.047 (0.20)    -2.178  (0.21) 
Only exclusive territories dummy (lagged)  1.583 (0.09)    0.418  (0.11) 
Only exclusive dealing dummy (lagged)  0.558 (0.14)    1.391  (0.12) 
Both exclusive restraints dummy (lagged)  1.661 (0.11)    1.513  (0.11) 
Other type of restraints (lagged)  -0.061 (0.09)    0.091  (0.09) 
R&D dummy  0.241 (0.08)    0.041  (0.08) 
Advertising dummy  0.347 (0.09)    0.250  (0.10) 
Exporter dummy  0.210 (0.08)    -0.012  (0.09) 
Size dummies (nº of workers)          
 From 21 to 50  0.130 (0.10)    0.079  (0.11) 
 From 51 to 100  0.317 (0.13)    0.269  (0.15) 
 From 101 to 200  0.243 (0.12)    0.280  (0.14) 
 From 201 to 500  0.209 (0.12)    0.430  (0.13) 
 More than 500  -0.077 (0.13)    0.358  (0.15) 
1998  0.107 (0.09)    0.006  (0.10) 
2002  -0.038 (0.10)    -0.061  (0.11) 
2006  -0.168 (0.08)    -0.108  (0.09) 
Industry dummies (20)  Included   Included 
      
) , ( it it t d Corr     0.722 (0.03)       
Log L.  -1778.4         
Nº observations  3110         
 
 
It is interesting to observe that no other type of vertical restraint has a significant effect on 
either exclusive territories or exclusive dealing. These results suggest that there exist 
complementarities between both of these types of vertical restraints. On the other hand, the 
coefficients of the rest of the variables indicate that firms with R&D and exporter firms are more 
likely to engage in the restraint of territories but not of exclusive dealing. Firms with positive 
expenditures in advertising are more likely to engage in one of these two restraints.   
 
The role of firm size is nonlinear in the case of exclusive territories, as the estimated 
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coefficients of the size dummies show. The medium-size firms (from 51 to 100 workers) are the 
ones that more frequently impose this restraint. In contrast, the largest firms (more than 100 
workers) are the ones that impose exclusive dealing more frequently. This result could indicate 
that small firms have less negotiation power induce to a distributor not to carry the brands of 
competing manufacturers.       
 
The estimated parameters of the year dummies show that there are no significant changes in 
the adoption of both restraints. Only the exclusive territories restriction is used less in 2006 than 
in previous periods. The estimated value of  ) , ( it it t d Corr    is a positive 0.72 and is statistically 
significant. Shocks that lead a firm to impose one exclusive vertical restraint tend to lead it to 
impose the other as well.  
 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper examines the manufacturing firm’s decisions to impose vertical restraints on their 
distributors. A standard bivariate probit model is estimated in which exclusive dealing and 
exclusive territories are treated as two separate binary decisions while considering 
contemporaneous correlation between the two choices. The results obtained suggest the existence 
of complementarities between both types of exclusive vertical restraints but not with other type of 
restraints. This finding underscores the importance of taking into account the effect of multiple 
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